The Foreign Policy Consequences of an Illiberal America

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Both in America and around the world, a once unthinkable question is being asked: Could authoritarian conservatives someday prove successful in subverting the American electoral process and turning America into an “illiberal democracy” or even an autocracy?

While America turning into an illiberal democracy or dictatorship would have the greatest impact on American domestic politics, what I will discuss here is what impact it would have both on America’s relations with other countries and on international relations more broadly. In my view, a generally acknowledged democratic decline in America would have an extremely negative impact on international relations. Counterintuitively, though, it might not have a particularly negative impact on America’s relations with other countries—or at least not initially.

America’s authoritarian adversaries—especially China and Russia—could be expected to welcome an authoritarian turn in the United States. They would loudly crow about how Washington could no longer assert that its being a democracy made America morally superior to them. An illiberal or authoritarian America, in other words, would be no better than illiberal or authoritarian regimes elsewhere. Further, such an America would presumably no longer advocate for the protection, much less propagation, of democracy abroad like it had in the past. While still competitive, relations between an illiberal or authoritarian America might well improve with a Russia or China that no longer see it as promoting their democratic transformation. They may even hope that an authoritarian America might be willing to enter into the sort of great power bargains over spheres of influence that a democratic America was not.

America’s authoritarian allies could also be expected to prefer an illiberal or authoritarian U.S. government. Such an America would end all efforts, however half-hearted and ineffectual they have often been, to encourage them to undertake democratic reforms and stop violating their citizens’ human rights. An authoritarian America and its authoritarian allies would instead have a common interest in suppressing all internal dissent in the name of protecting stability.

America’s democratic allies, of course, would be alarmed and dismayed by democratic decline in the U.S. Some of them could be expected to loudly denounce this development and warn of the negative impact it would have on their alliances with Washington. But would this really occur? The fact that so many of America’s allies already get along well with authoritarian regimes in Russia, China, and elsewhere suggests that they would accommodate themselves to an authoritarian America too. And since they will continue to fear Russia, China, Iran, or North Korea, America’s democratic allies might not quibble about remaining allied to an undemocratic America if it was still willing to protect them against their common adversaries. Further, just as most Muslim countries overlook Beijing’s and Moscow’s harsh treatment of their Muslim populations for fear of harming their relations with China and Russia, America’s democratic allies may decide that it would be prudent to avoid making too much of an issue of America’s democratic decline for fear of harming their alliances with the U.S. The deferential manner in which the leaders of so many democratic countries have treated Donald Trump suggests that this is possible.

The dismaying implication of this analysis, then, is that however harmful democratic decline would be for America’s domestic politics, it might not be all that harmful to America’s relations with other countries. Indeed, an illiberal or authoritarian America might even have better relations with America’s authoritarian allies and adversaries than it does now, while America’s democratic allies might well have to adjust to it just as they do with other authoritarian regimes.

But whatever the state of its relations with other governments, America becoming an illiberal democracy or authoritarian regime would have a profound impact on the international system as a whole. Some might hope that the European Union could take up the mantle of being the main democratic great power, serving as an example which inspires other countries—including America—to emulate. Indeed, there are many Europeans who have long wanted the EU to act as a great power itself, especially after Donald Trump cast doubt on America’s willingness to continue underwriting European security.

It is not clear, though, that the EU could replace the U.S. as the world’s preeminent democratic great power. Among other problems, Europe itself is experiencing a rise in authoritarian nationalism which could accelerate as a result of American democratic decline. As Mika Aaltola, now a Member of the European Parliament, put it in his 2021 book, Democratic Vulnerability and Autocratic Meddling, “political regression in one place is linked to its likelihood in other places.” Democratic decline in the U.S., then, could foster democratic decline in Europe and elsewhere.

Instead, international relations might come to resemble previous historical periods in which authoritarianism prevailed. Various great powers might alternate between competing with each other for alliances with smaller states on the one hand and cooperating with each other in agreeing on spheres of influence over the same smaller states on the other. Smaller states might still see themselves as needing to ally with an illiberal or authoritarian America if they remain more fearful of Russia or China. But if they also become wary of an illiberal or authoritarian America, smaller states would seek to balance between the U.S. on the one hand and China or Russia on the other in an attempt to maximize their autonomy. For while smaller countries may still ally with the U.S., others may hedge against an illiberal America which they perceive as “little different” or even “no different” from other authoritarian great powers. There are definitely reasons, then, to fear the negative impact of an illiberal or authoritarian turn inside the U.S. on what American foreign policy can achieve.